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RECENT DECISIONS
ANNULMENT-REQUIREMENT OF "OTHER SATISFACTORY EVI-
DENCE" BESIDES CONFESSION OF EITHER PARTY.-The plaintiff
brought an action to annul her seven-month-old marriage to the
defendant on the ground that he had fraudulently induced her to
marry him. The defendant allegedly represented to the plaintiff that
he would have marital relations when, in fact, he never intended and
never did fulfill his promise., The defendant, who insisted that the
marriage had been consummated, was asked whether the plaintiff had
any conspicuous scars on her person. He testified that she did not.
The existence of such scars was then demonstrated by a physician.
The question was whether this constituted ". . . other satisfactory
evidence of the facts.. ." within the meaning of Section 1143 of the
New York Civil Practice Act,.' The Appellate Division affirmed
the annulment granted by the trial court. Held, judgment affirmed.
In an annulment action the declaration or confession of either party
to the marriage is not alone sufficient as proof. There must be other
satisfactory evidence of the facts. But the language of the statute
only requires that there be, in addition, to the declarations or con-
fessions of either party, other material from other sources, substan-
tial and reliable enough to satisfy the conscience of the trier of the
facts. De Baillet-Latour v. De Baillet-Latour, 301 N. Y. 428, 94
N. E. 2d 715 (1950).
The statute is but a reiteration of a rule which emanates from
the ecclesiastical courts of England.2 It is still the law today." The
express purpose of the canon was to preclude annulments based on
collusive evidence. For this reason, the ecclesiastical courts refused
to grant annulments in suits based on impotency unless the alleged
incapacity was established by a medical examination ordered by the
2 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1143. "... a final judgment annulling the mar-
riage shall not be rendered . . . without proof of the facts upon which the
allegation of nullity is founded. The declaration or confession of either party
to the marriage is not alone sufficient as proof, but other satisfactory evidence
of the facts must be produced."
2 Canon 105, ratified at the Convocation of Canterbury (1603), provides:
"Forasmuch as matrimonial causes have been always reckoned among the
weightiest . . . we do straitly charge that in all proceedings to divorce and
nullities of matrimony, good circumspection be used . . . and that credit be
not given to the sole confessions of the parties themselves . .. ."
3 Canon 105 was incorporated in the N. Y. Rev. Stat., part II, c. VIII,
tit. I, § 36 (1829). It was subsequently enacted into the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure by the N. Y. Laws 1880, c. 178. From here it was transferred into
the Civil- Practice Act.
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court.4 When the state legislatures conferred jurisdiction in matri-
monial matters upon their respective tribunals it was not their intent
to create a different principle.5 Consequently, the uniform practice
of the ecclesiastical courts was adopted here.6
The courts have concluded that the statute prohibits a judgment
of annulment rendered solely on the testimony of either party to
the marriage.7 They have differed, however, as to what constitutes
the degree of corroboration necessary to meet the statutory require-
ment of ". . . other satisfactory evidence . . . ." The realization
that annulments were being sought where absolute divorces could
not be obtained on statutory grounds 8 prompted many courts to re-
fuse relief where the other evidence was not such as to constitute
proof of a clear and convincing character in respect to all essential
elements.9 Obviously, however, not all annulment actions will admit
to ready proof. A plaintiff's difficulty is one of proof because his
evidence depends largely on the statements of the parties themselves
as verified by their witnesses. Notwithstanding, the witnesses' tes-
timony simply proves that the defendant made a declaration or con-
fession to which the plaintiff testified and nothing more. Such evi-
dence, however, is insufficient.1 0
Although the statute limits the right to relief, it does, nonethe-
less, sanction it when other satisfactory evidence exists. It could
not be that the ingredients of corroboration were meant to be so
circumscribed as to be unattainable.' The advocates of this second
viewpoint, in contrast to the view that the evidence must be clear
4 Briggs v. Morgan, 3 Phil. 325, 161 Eng. Rep. 1339 (Ecc. 1820); Norton
v. Seton, 3 Phil. 147, 161 Eng. Rep. 1283 (Ecc. 1819); Welde v. Welde, 2
Lee 579, 161 Eng. Rep. 446 (Ecc. 1730).5 Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige 554 (N. Y. 1836); Perry v. Perry,
2 Paige 501 (N. Y. 1831). Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N. Y. 134, 137 (1872).
6 Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige 554 (N. Y. 1836) ; Le Barron v. Le
Barron, 35 Vt. 364 (1862); Gore v. Gore, 103 App. Div. 168 93 N. Y. Supp.
396 (3d Dep't 1905). Accord, Anonymous v. Anonymous, 69 Misc. 489, 126
N. Y. Supp. 149 (Sup. Ct. 1910).7 Weiman v. Weiman, 295 N. Y. 150, 65 N. E. 2d 754 (1946); Feig v.
Feig, 232 App. Div. 172, 249 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1st Dep't 1931); Hall v. Hall,
139 App. Div. 120, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1056 (1st Dep't 1910); Zoske v. Zoske,
64 N. Y. S. 2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Steimer v Steimer, 37 Misc. 26, 74 N. Y.
Supp 714 (Sup. Ct 1902).
8 Cf. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N. Y. 74, 87, 150 N. E. 605, 610 (1926)
(dissenting opinion).0 See, e.g., Gabriel v. Gabriel, 274 App. Div. 141, 143, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 823,
825 (1st Dep't 1948); Jones v. Jones, 189 Misc. 145, 147, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 223,
225 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Gerwitz v. Gervitz, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 327, 330 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
o10Accord, Caleca v. Caleca, 125 N. Y. L. J. 62, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 5,
1951). See note 7 mtpra.
"I Cf. Sigel v. Sigel, 20 N. Y. Supp. 377, 378 (Super. Ct. 1892) ; Richardson
v. Richardson, 125 N. Y. L. J. 813, col. 4 (Sup. Ct Mar. 7, 1951) (if so narrow
a construction were placed on Section 1143 as to demand direct corroboration
it would be tantamount to saying the legislature offered but a hollow shell
without substance).
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and convincing, considered that the other satisfactory evidence nec-
essary may be direct or inferential, according to the circumstances
of the case.1 2 Apparently leaning more to this approach, the Court
of Appeals may have taken cognizance of the practical aspects of
the problem. The secrets of the bedchamber, unsusceptible as they
are to clear-cut verification, appear to furnish a natural foundation
for the exercise of judicial discretion.'8 In light of this, the failure
of the statute to define satisfactory evidence is not without signifi-
cance. 14 But this should not mean that the court will abandon the
clear and convincing proof requirement in all suits for annulment.'5
The statute was enacted to prevent fraud and collusion, and to this
end it should be given effect.16
While there are circumstances in the present case which might
give rise to doubts as to the genuineness of the alleged fraud, it
must be remembered that the Court of Appeals was without any
power to review the weight of the evidence.' 7 Moreover, the issue
before the Court of Appeals was not proof of either the defendant's
fraudulent intent or of the fraud.' 8 The statute, however, does not
require that there be other satisfactory evidence to establish the
fraud, but only that such evidence exist to corroborate it. An
opportune illustration of this distinction is afforded by two decisions
which were handed down subsequent to the case at bar. In Caleca
v. Caleca,19 the court believed the plaintiff's testimony and yet re-
fused to grant an annulment because of the lack of corroborative
evidence. In Richardson v. Richardson,"0 however, the court de-
12 See, e.g., Rubman v. Rubman, 140 Misc. 658 674, 251 N. Y. Supp. 474,
491 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Bentz v. Bentz, 188 Misc. A6, 88, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 345,
348 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (what constitutes other satisfactory evidence rests in dis-
cretion of court); Zoske v. Zoske, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 819, 834 (Sup. Ct. 1946)
(the character of evidence required is the inverse ratio to probability of plain-
tiff's cause); accord, Richardson v. Richardson, 125 N. Y. L. J. 813, col. 5
(Sup. Ct. Mar. 7, 1951).
1s Vanneman, Annulment of Marriage for Fraud, 9 MINN. L. Rnv. 497, 512(1925).
14 Cf. Richardson v. Richardson, 125 N. Y. L. J. 813, 814, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.
Mar. 7, 1951)
15 Chambers v. Chambers, 32 N. Y. Supp. 875 (1895) (church register in-
sufficient proof of bigamous marriage) ; see note 6 supra.
16 Cf. Bentz v. Bentz, 188 Misc. 86, 88, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 345, 348 (Sup. Ct.
1947) (the court may not in its discretion dispense entirely with this statutory
rule).
17 Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N Y 422 169 N. E. 632 (1930); Ferguson v. Ferguson,
271 App. Div. 976 (2d Dep't 1947).
Is See De Baillet-Latour v. De Baillet-Latour, 301 N. Y. 428, 435, 94 N. E.
2d 715, 722 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
19 125 N. Y. L. J. 62, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 5, 1951). '... we have only
the defendant's . . .confession .... The testimony of plaintiff's two witnesses
is no corroboration of the fraud. . . .Their testimony simply proves that
defendant made the . . . confession ... and nothing more." Revd, 125 N. Y.
L. J. 1296, col. 5 (App. Div., 2, Dep't, April 10, 1951).
20125 N. Y. L. J. 813, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 7, 1951). "... the fact that
... he [defendant] tore from her finger the rings which had sealed their
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creed an annulment when it was satisfied that other evidence existed.
The present case is not without precedent. It bears a striking
similarity to the decisions in actions for divorce which appear to
support the conclusion reached here. At an early date, the 105th
canon was applied to such actions.21 These decisions uniformly
recognize that the confessions of the parties are insufficient proof.22
They differ, however, in respect that they held the testimony of the
parties to the marriage to be admissible; corroboration thereof merely
being required to avoid collusion.23 It logically followed, therefore,
that a confession of adultery, when free from all taint of collusion,justified a decree of divorce.24 The theory was that when the reason
for the rule fails, the rule itself ceases.25 Still another interesting
comparison is presented by the cases requiring corroboration of the
testimony of private detectives and prostitutes.26 But again the court
refused to be bound by a rigid rule of evidence, and accordingly
determined the rule to be one for the guidance of the judicial con-
science.217
The resemblance between annulment and divorce cases can be
discerned more vividly, however, in the rationale of the decisions
which appear to leave to the court an area in which to exercise its
discretion; at once, flexible enough to provide bona fide petitioners
with the redress permitted by law, and yet, at the same time, sturdy
enough to protect the purpose for the requirement of corroboration.
The wisdom of a decision which leaves to the judiciary the function
of safeguarding public policy cannot be questioned.
APBITRATION-COmPETENCY OF AimITRAToRs.-During recent
years arbitration has been resorted to more and more for the settle-
ment of business controversies. With this increase there has been
betrothal . . . is eloquent corroborative evidence that ... he had no intention
to live with her.., in accordance with his promise... :'
2 1 See Betts v. Betts, 1 Johns. Ch. 197 (N. Y. 1814). When the canon was
embodied in statutory form no mention was made of its applicability to divorce
actions. N. Y. Ray. STAT., part II, c. VIII, tit. I, § 36. "No sentence of
nullity'... shall be pronounced .... "2 2 Fowler v. Fowler, 29 Misc. 670, 61 N. Y. Supp. 10 (1899) ; Mont-
gomery v. Montgomery, 3 Barb. Chi. 132 (N. Y. 1848); Betts v. Betts, 1
Johns. Ch. 197 (N. Y. 1814). 54( 86,Lo .~yn au23 Madge v. Madge, 42 Hun 524 (N. Y. 1886); Lyon v. Lyon, 62 Barb.
138 (N. Y. 1861); Doe v. Roe, 1 Johns. 25 (N. Y. 1799).
24 See note 23 supra.
25 Cf. Lyon v. Lyon, 62 Barb. 138, 142 (N. Y. 1861).26 McCarthy v. McCarthy, 143 N. Y. 235, 398 N. E. 288 (1894); Moller
v. Moller, 115 N. Y. 466, 22 N. E. 169 (1889); Platt v. Platt 5 Daly 295(N. Y. 1874).
27 Yates v. Yates, 211 N. Y. 163, 105 N. E. 195 (1914) ; Winston v. Winston,
165 N. Y. 553, 59 N. E. 273, aff'd, 189 U. S. 506 (1901). Cf. McKeon v.
Van Slyck, 223 N. Y. 392, 398, 119 N. E. 851, 852 (1918).
1951 ]
